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2Abstract
We propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by
cooperation is to be shared in zero-monotonic environments with transferable utility. The
mechanism consists of  a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage. We show that the
subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the
Shapley value payoffs. We extend our results to implement the weighted Shapley values.
Finally, we generalize our mechanism to handle arbitrary transferable utility
environments. The modified mechanism generates an efficient coalition structure, and
implements the Shapley values of the super-additive cover of the environment.
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31.- Introduction
The Shapley value has long been a central solution concept in cooperative game
theory. It was introduced in Shapley [24] and was seen as a reasonable way of
distributing the gains of cooperation among the players in the game. It is the most studied
and widely used single-valued solution concept in cooperative game theory. It has
generated various axiomatizations that demonstrate its fairness and consistency properties
(see, for instance, Myerson [19], and Hart and Mas-Colell [12], and has been used to
impute costs and benefits as in cases of airport runways, phone networks, and political
situations.1
A natural question concerning the Shapley value is whether the agents can reach it
through non-cooperative behavior. In other words, is it possible to find a non-cooperative
framework that gives rise to the Shapley value as the result of equilibrium behavior? This
is part of the Nash program, which tries to provide a non-cooperative foundation for
cooperative solution concepts. Several papers have addressed this question in different
ways. We will comment on them later in this introduction.
In this paper, we provide a simple non-cooperative game whose outcome always
coincides with the Shapley value for zero-monotonic games in characteristic form. We
call this game the "bidding mechanism". The basic idea of the bidding mechanism is quite
simple. We let one of the players make a proposal to each of the other players, a proposal
that will either be accepted by all the other players (in which case the proposal becomes
final) or rejected. In the latter case, the proposer is now on his own and the rest of the
players play the same game again. If the proposal is accepted, the proposer can form the
grand coalition of all the players and collect the value generated in exchange for the
proposed payments to the rest of the players.
The question of how the proposer is determined is, of course, central to the design of
the bidding mechanism. Indeed, in some games, being the proposer could prove to be
beneficial, while in other games it is preferable not to be the proposer. Hence, before the
proposal stage is reached, the players will bid to become the proposer, where bids can be
positive or negative.2 The player with the highest “net bid” (the difference between the
4sum of the bids he makes to the others minus the sum of the bids the others make to him)
becomes the proposer and, before proceeding to the proposal stage, pays the bids to the
other players. We will show that in the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) of the bidding
mechanism a proposer is determined who will make a proposal that will be accepted by
the others. For the proposer, the difference between the value of the grand coalition and
the payments and bids paid is her Shapley value. For each of the other players as well, the
sum of the bid received plus the accepted proposal is his Shapley value.3
Several features of our game make it attractive and different from previous non-
cooperative approaches to the Shapley value. First, the players obtain the Shapley value
in every equilibrium outcome of the game; that is, the implementation is not in expected
terms. Also, the game does not imply any a priori randomization that imposes some order
on the moves of the players. By adjusting his bids, every player can determine whether he
or someone else will be the proposer. Second, the rules of the game are very natural and
do not rely on "random" meetings or probabilities that are close to the actual definition of
the Shapley value. Hence, the implementation is less "obvious", and provides further
support for the use of the Shapley value. Third, the game is finite. Moreover, at
equilibrium, it ends in one stage if the game is strictly zero-monotonic (a stage includes
three periods of play: bidding, proposing, and accepting or rejecting). Fourth, the
strategies played by the players at equilibrium are simple and intuitive. Furthermore, even
though the Shapley value plays no role in specifying the rules of the game, the
equilibrium strategies are intimately related to the Shapley value itself.
Implementing the Shapley value is not straightforward. For example, Thomson [27]
focused on the problems created by strategic behavior and showed that an agent can
obtain a better outcome by unilaterally misrepresenting his utility function. Several
authors have attempted to realize the Shapley value and overcome such problems.
Gul ([7]  and [8]) analyzed a transferable utility economy where random meetings
between two agents occur. At each meeting, a randomly chosen party makes an offer to
his partner. Acceptance of the offer means that the proposer buys the partner's resources.
If the offer is rejected, the meeting dissolves and both agents stay in the market. For
strictly convex games, as the time interval between meetings becomes arbitrarily small,
5the expected payoff of each player at an efficient stationary subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium (SSPE) converges to his Shapley value. If strict convexity is replaced by
strict superadditivity the convergence result holds for those efficient SSPE that entail
immediate agreement (Gul [7] and Hart and Levy [11]).
Evans [5] showed that a simplified version of Gul’s result follows from the
following characterization of the Shapley value. Consider a cooperative game and an
associated feasible payoff vector. Assume that players are randomly split into two groups
and a representative player is chosen also at random from each group. These two players
bargain with each other over how to split the total resources available to all of the players.
Following the bargaining process each of the two players has to pay out of his share to
the members of his group according to the pre-specified payoff vector.  This procedure
yields an expected payoff to any player that depends on the initial payoff vector, the
random partition mechanism and the solution concept applied to two-person bargaining
problems. The initial payoff vector is called consistent if it equals the expected payoff
vector. If all partitions are equally likely and the bargaining solution splits the surplus
equally, the Shapley payoff vector is the unique consistent payoff vector.
Hart and Mas-Colell [13] proposed a different natural bargaining procedure that
supports the Shapley value (as well as the Nash bargaining solution for pure bargaining
problems). In their paper, the proposers are also chosen at random but the meetings are
multilateral. Agreement requires unanimity. Disagreement puts the proposer in jeopardy,
since there is a given probability that he may be removed from the game after a rejection.
As the probability of removal becomes small, the SSPE of the procedure yield the
Shapley value.4 When the probability of removal is one, Hart and Mas-Colell [13] as well
as Mas-Colell [18] showed that the expected payoff of any player coincides with his
Shapley value. Their mechanism is then the same as our mechanism with the bidding
stage replaced by a random determination of the proposer. Krishna and Serrano [15]
showed further that for removal probabilities close to one there is a unique SPE of the
game proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell [13] that yields the Shapley value payoff vector
in expectation.
6In a different spirit, Hart and Moore [14] proposed a game in which agents are lined
up and each agent makes an offer to the following agent, where the offer is a contract that
may specify what offer this agent has to make to the agent after him. This game
implements the Shapley value in SPE. Winter [28] and Dasgupta and Chiu [4] proposed
demand commitment games in which each player can either make a demand to the
following player or form a coalition satisfying the demands of some of the players
preceding him. For strictly convex games, these mechanisms implement the Shapley
value in SPE.5 In these three works, the implementation is in expected terms since in the
first stage of the game the order of the players (or the identity of the first player in
Winter, 1994) is randomly chosen, each possible choice having the same probability.
A solution concept closely related to the Shapley value is the weighted Shapley
value (Shapley [25]). We also show that a very natural and simple modification of the
bidding mechanism implements the weighted Shapley values.6
Finally, we generalize the bidding mechanism to deal with all transferable utility
environments. In the generalized bidding mechanism, the proposer makes a proposal to
each of the other players and, simultaneously, chooses the coalition she wants to form. If
all the agents accept the proposal and the coalition, the coalition is formed, and the rest of
the players proceed to play the same game among themselves (after having received the
proposed payment by the proposer). In the case of rejection, the proposer is on her own
and the remaining players play the same game again. In any SPE of this mechanism, the
proposer makes a proposal that is accepted. The payoff of the proposer is the difference
between the value of the coalition she formed and the payments and bids she made. The
payoff to any player in the coalition is the sum of the bid and the proposal accepted. The
payoff to players outside the coalition is the sum of the bid, the proposal accepted, and
their payment in the continuation game. Hence, the SPE of this mechanism determine a
coalition structure and a sharing of the surplus generated under this particular structure.
We show that at the SPE of the generalized bidding mechanism the players form an
efficient coalition structure. Moreover, the final payments of the players coincide with the
Shapley values of the super-additive cover of the game.7
7The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic cooperative
definitions and Section 3 introduces the bidding mechanism and shows that it implements
the Shapley value for zero-monotonic games. In Section 4 we extend our results by
implementing the set of weighted Shapley values. In Section 5 we define the generalized
bidding mechanism and show that it implements the Shapley value of the super-additive
cover of the game. The paper concludes with a brief summary and discussion of further
research.
2.- The cooperative model
Consider a cooperative game in characteristic form (N, v), where N = {1,…, n} is
the set of players and v: 2N → R is a characteristic function satisfying v(Φ) = 0 where Φ is
the empty set. For a coalition S⊆N, v(S) represents the total payoff that the partners in S
can jointly obtain if this coalition is formed. We say that the cooperative game (N, v) is
zero-monotonic if v(S) + v({i}) ≤ v(S∪{i}) for any subset S⊆N with i∉S. In a zero-
monotonic game there are no negative externalities when a single
 player joins a coalition. In sections 2 to 4 of this paper, we restrict our analysis to zero-
monotonic games.
We denote by φ(N)∈Rn the Shapley value of the cooperative game (N, v) which is
defined by: 8
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where S denotes the cardinality of the subset S. The Shapley value can be interpreted
as the expected marginal contribution made by a player to the value of a coalition, where
the distributions of coalitions is such that any ordering of the players is equally likely.
Also, Shapley [24] characterized the value as the only function that satisfies symmetry,
efficiency, a null player axiom, and additivity.
8Given the cooperative game (N, v) and a subset S⊆N, we define the game (S, vS) by
assigning the value vS(T) ≡ v(T) to every T⊆S. We write (S, v) instead of (S, vS) for
notational convenience. Similarly, φ(S)∈RS denotes the Shapley value of the game (S,
v).
3.- The bidding mechanism
In this section, we design a non-cooperative game, which we call the bidding
mechanism. The equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism always coincide with the
Shapley value of the cooperative game (N, v) and thus this mechanism implements the
Shapley value in subgame perfect equilibria. We propose a way to split the surplus of the
cooperation that is based upon the idea that only one of the players will make a proposal
to each of the other players. We invoke a notion of consistency in order to determine the
outcome of the game if the proposal is rejected. Following a rejection the players other
than the proposer play the same game again. Proceeding in this way, the payoff of an
agent is sensitive not only to whether or not he is the proposer, but also to the precise
identity of the proposer. Hence, in order to provide each player with the same strategic
possibilities, each player can, by his bid, directly influence the choice of the proposer. An
intriguing feature of the mechanism is that the Shapley value is not the outcome of just
one decision, but rather emerges as the cumulative outcome of both the proposal and the
bid.
The mechanism is defined recursively. If there is only one player, then he just
obtains the value of his stand-alone coalition. It is also useful to describe the bidding
mechanism with only two players. It is a three-stage game. First, each player makes a bid
to the other. The proposer is then chosen as the player making the highest bid. If the bids
are equal the proposer is chosen randomly. The proposer pays the promised bid to her
partner. In the second stage, the proposer makes an offer to the other player for him to
join her. In the final stage, the player who is not the proposer either accepts or rejects the
offer. If he accepts, the grand coalition is formed and the proposer collects the value
generated by it while paying the offer to the other player. If the proposal is rejected each
9player is left on his own, and hence each obtains the value of the stand-alone coalition
(minus or plus the bid paid previously). Once we know the rules of a two-player bidding
mechanism, we can define the mechanism for three players, and so on. Assuming that we
know the rules of the bidding mechanism when played by at most n−1 players, we now
define the game for n players.
First, each of the players makes a bid to each of the other players. To determine the
identity of the proposer, we define the “net bid” of a player as the difference between the
sum of the bids he makes to the others minus the sum of the bids the others make to him.
The net bid of a player tries to measure the difference between the incentives of this
player to become the proposer (what he bids) and what the others are ready to pay him for
each of them to become the proposer (what the others bid to him). The player with the
highest net bid is chosen to be the proposer. If several players make the highest net bid,
the proposer is chosen randomly among them. Once “named” a proposer, she proceeds to
pay the bids to the other players. Second, the proposer makes an offer to each of the other
players to join her. Finally, each of the other players sequentially either accepts or rejects
the offer.9 The offer is accepted, and all the players join in the grand coalition, only if all
of them accept the offer. In this case, the proposer obtains the value of the coalition,
paying to the others the promised offers. If the offer is rejected, the proposer is on her
own, obtaining the value of her stand-alone coalition (minus the bids she has already
paid)
.
10
 The rest of the players keep their bids and play the same game with n−1 players.
It is important to notice that the element of randomness in the determination of the
proposer is inconsequential to our proofs. Our results still hold if ties in net bids are
broken deterministically as would be the case if the highest indexed player were chosen
as the proposer. Randomness is introduced only in order to prevent biased treatment of
the participating players. We will return to this issue in the conclusion, when we will
discuss possible extensions of our mechanism.
We now describe the bidding mechanism more formally. Suppose first that there is
only one player {i}. Then, this player obtains the value of the stand-alone coalition (i.e.,
v(i)).
10
Suppose now that we know the rules of the bidding mechanism when played by at
most n−1 players. The bidding game for a set of players N = {1,..., n} proceeds as
follows:
t = 1: Each player i∈N makes bids bij in R for every j ≠ i. Hence, at this stage, a
strategy for player i is a vector (bij)j≠i in Rn−1.
For each i∈N, we let ∑∑
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j
i
ij
i
j
i bbB . Let α = argmaxi(Bi) where, in the case of a non-
unique maximizer, α is randomly chosen among the maximizing indices. Once she has
been chosen, player α pays bαi to every player i ≠ α.
t = 2: Player α makes an offer yαj in R to every player j ≠ α. Therefore, at this stage a
strategy for player i is a vector (yij)j≠i in Rn−1 that he will follow if he is chosen to be the
proposer.
t = 3: The players other than α, sequentially, either accept or reject the offer. If a
rejection is encountered, we say the offer is rejected. Otherwise, we say the offer is
accepted.
If the offer is rejected, all players other than α proceed to play the bidding
mechanism where the set of players is N\{α} and player α obtains the value of her stand-
alone coalition. On the other hand, if the offer is accepted, each player i ≠ α receives yαi
and player α obtains the value of the grand coalition minus the payments ∑
≠α
α
i
iy .
Given that the characteristic function is v(.), the final payment for player α in case of
rejection is ∑
≠
−
α
αα
i
ibv )( . Final payments for the other players will be the sum of the bid
bαi received and the outcome of the mechanism where the players are N\{α}. In case of
acceptance of the proposal, final payment to any player i other than α is given by yαi +
bαi, whereas player α obtains ∑∑
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α
α
α
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i
i
i byNv )( .
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In order to analyze the outcome of the bidding mechanism, the following well-
known characterization of the Shapley value will be useful. The Shapley value of a player
i is the average of the marginal contribution of this player to the grand coalition and his
Shapley values in the games where a player different from i has been removed. Or, more
formally,
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This equation has been previously used by Maschler and Owen [16] and Hart and
Mas-Colell [12]. Furthermore, note that it provides a convenient recursive definition of
the Shapley value. Defining φi({i}) = v(i) for every i, the previous equation characterizes
the Shapley value for every game (N, v).
Theorem 1.- The bidding mechanism implements the Shapley value of the zero-
monotonic game (N, v) in SPE.
Proof: The proof proceeds by induction on the number of players n. The theorem holds
for k = 1, since for a one-player game, the value of his stand-alone coalition is the
Shapley value.
We now assume that the theorem holds for k = n−1 and show that it also holds for k
= n. We take N = {1,..., n}. We first prove that the Shapley value payoff is indeed an
equilibrium outcome. We explicitly construct an SPE that yields the Shapley value as an
SPE outcome. Consider the following strategies:
At t = 1, each player i, i ∈ N, announces }){\()( iNNb jjij φφ −= , for every j ≠ i.
At t = 2, player i, i ∈ N, if he is the proposer, offers }){\( iNy jij φ=  to every j ≠ i.
At t = 3, player i, i ∈ N, if player j ≠ i is the proposer, accepts any offer greater than
or equal to φi(N\{j}) and rejects any offer strictly smaller than φi(N\{j}).
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It is clear that these strategies yield the Shapley value for any player who is not the
proposer, since xαi = bαi + yαi = φi(N), for i ≠ α. Moreover, given that following the
strategies the grand coalition is formed, the proposer also obtains her Shapley value.
We now show that all net bids Bi are equal to zero. Following the above mentioned
strategies,
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By the balanced contributions property (see Myerson [19])
 }){\()(}){\()( jNNiNN iijj φφφφ −=−
and hence Bi = 0.
To check that the previous strategies constitute an SPE note, first, that the strategies at t =
2 and t = 3 are best responses as long as }){\(}){\()()( iNviNivNv
ij
j =≥− ∑
≠
φ . Indeed,
in the case of rejection, a proposer i obtains v(i) and the players j ≠ i play the bidding
mechanism where N\{i} is the set of players; by the induction argument, the outcome of
this game is the Shapley value vector (φj(N\{i}))j≠i. Consider now the strategies at t = 1. If
player i increases his total bid ∑
≠ij
i
jb , he will be chosen as the proposer with certainty, but
his payoff will decrease. If he decreases his total bid another player will propose, and
player i’s payoff would still equal his Shapley value. Finally, any change in his bids that
leaves the total bid constant will influence the identity of the proposer but will not alter
player i’s payoff.
We now show that any SPE yields the Shapley value. We proceed by a series of
claims:
Claim (a). In any SPE, at t = 3, all players other than the proposer α accept the offer if
yαi > φi(N\{α}) for every player i ≠ α. Moreover, if yαi < φi(N\{α}) for at least some i ≠
α, then the offer is rejected.
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Note that in the case of rejection, by the induction argument the payoff to a player i ≠ α is
φi(N\{α}). We denote the last player that has to decide whether to accept or reject the
offer, at t = 3, by β. If the game reaches player β, i.e., there has been no previous
rejection, his optimal strategy involves accepting any offer higher than φβ(N\{α}) and
rejecting any offer lower than φβ(N\{α}). The second to last player (denoted by β−1)
anticipates the reaction of player β. Hence, if yαβ−1 > φβ−1(N\{α}) and yαβ > φβ(N\{α}),
and the game reaches player β−1, he will accept the offer. If yαβ−1 < φβ−1(N\{α}) and yαβ
> φβ(N\{α}), he will reject the offer. If yαβ < φβ(N\{α}), player β−1 is indifferent to
accepting or rejecting any offer yαβ−1, since he knows that player β is bound to reject the
offer should the game reach him. In any case, the offer is rejected. We can go backwards
using the same argument to prove claim (a).
Claim (b). If v(N) > v(N\{α}) + v(α), the only SPE of the game that starts at t = 2 is the
following: At t = 2, player α offers yαi = φi(N\{α}) to all i ≠ α; at t = 3, every player i
≠ α accepts any offer yαi ≥ φi(N\{α}) and rejects the offer otherwise.
If v(N) = v(N\{α}) + v(α) there exist SPE in addition to the previous one. Any set of
strategies where, at t = 2, the proposer offers yαj ≤ φj(N\{α}) to a particular player j ≠
α
 and, at t = 3, the player j rejects any offer yαj ≤ φj(N\{α}), also constitutes an SPE.
In all the SPE of this subgame, the final payoffs to players α and i ≠ α are
∑
≠
−−
α
αα
j
jbNvNv }){\()( and φi(N\{α}) + bαi , respectively.
It is easy to see that the proposed strategies constitute an SPE. Suppose now that v(N) >
v(N\{α}) + v(α). In that case, rejection of the offers made by player α cannot be part of
an SPE. In such a case, player α receives v(α). She can improve her payoff by offering
φi(N\{α}) + ε/(n−1) to every i ≠ α, with ε < v(N) − v(N\{α}) − v(α) and ε > 0 so that her
offers are accepted (by (a)). Therefore, an SPE requires acceptance of the proposal. This
implies yαi ≥ φi(N\{α}) for all i ≠ α. However, an offer such that yαj > φj(N\{α}) for some
j ≠ α cannot be part of an SPE, since α could still offer φi(N\{α}) + ε/(n−1) to every i ≠
α, with ε < yαj − φj(N\{α}) and ε > 0. These offers are accepted and α’s payoff increases.
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Hence, yαi = φi(N\{α}) for all i ≠ α at any SPE. Finally, acceptance of the proposals
implies that, at t = 3, every agent i ≠ α accepts an offer if yαi ≥ φi(N\{α}).
If v(N) = v(N\{α}) + v(α), then the proposer has to offer at least ∑
≠α
αφ
j
j N }){\(  =
v(N\{α}) for the offer to be accepted by every other player. By the same argument as in
the previous case, every equilibrium in which the offer is accepted necessarily involves a
proposal of exactly φj(N\{α}) for every j ≠ α. Given that the proposer obtains v(α) in case
of rejection, any offer that leads to a rejection would be an SPE as well.
Notice that following the first strategies, the offer is accepted and the grand coalition is
formed, while the second strategies imply that the proposer is left on her own. Given that
the last strategies are SPE only when v(N) = v(N\{α}) + v(α), it is easy to check that the
final payoffs are those stated in the claim.
Claim (c). In any SPE, Bi = Bj for all i and j and hence Bi = 0 for all i in N.
Denote Ω = {i∈NBi = Maxj (Bj)}. If Ω = N the claim is satisfied since 0=∑
∈Ni
iB .
Otherwise, we can show that any player i in Ω can change his bids so as to decrease the
sum of payments in case he wins. Furthermore, these changes can be made without
altering the set Ω. Hence, he maintains the same probability of winning, and obtains a
higher expected payoff. Take some player j∉Ω. Let player i∈Ω change his strategy by
announcing: b’ik = bik + δ for all k∈Ω and k ≠ i; b’ij = bij − Ωδ; and b’il = bil for all l∉Ω
and l ≠ j. The new net bids are: B’i = Bi − δ; B’k= Bk − δ for all k∈Ω and k ≠ i; B’j = Bj +
Ωδ and B’l = Bl for all l∉Ω and l ≠ j. If δ is small enough, so that Bj + Ωδ < Bi −
δ (remember that Bj < Bi), then B’l < B’i = B’k for all l∉Ω (including j) and for all k∈Ω.
Therefore, Ω does not change. However, ∑∑
≠≠
<−
ih
i
h
ih
i
h bb δ .
Claim (d). In any SPE, each player’s payoff is the same regardless of who is chosen as
the proposer.
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We already know that all the bids Bi are the same. If player i would strictly prefer to be
the proposer, he could improve his payoff by slightly increasing one of his bids bij.
Similarly, if player i would strictly prefer that some other player j were the proposer, he
could improve his payoff by decreasing bij. The fact that player i does not do so in
equilibrium means that he is indifferent to the proposer’s identity.
Claim (e). In any SPE, the final payment received by each of the players coincides
with his Shapley value.
Note first that, if player i is the proposer, his final payoff is given by:
∑
≠
−−=
ij
i
j
i
i biNvNvx }){\()( . On the other hand, if player j ≠ i is the proposer, the final
payoff of player i is given by: jii
j
i bjNx += }){\(φ . Therefore, the sum of payoffs to
player i over all possible choices of the proposer is given by:
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Moreover, since player i is indifferent to all possible choices of the proposer, we have xji
= x
k
i for all j, k. Therefore xji = φi(N) for all j in N. Q. E. D.
The theorem, in addition to showing that the mechanism indeed realizes the Shapley
value, provides us with the explicit form of the equilibrium strategies. The ease by which
these strategies can be computed adds further credibility to our results and helps in the
actual implementation of the mechanism. At equilibrium, the bid of player i to player j is
}){\()( iNN jj φφ − . The balanced contributions property (see Myerson [19]) implies that
the bid can also be expressed as }){\()( jNN ii φφ − , which is the contribution of player j
to the Shapley value of player i. In particular, the bids are symmetric: player i bids for j
just as much as player j bids for i. Furthermore, the determination of the offers is also
simple. If player i is the proposer, he offers φj(N\{i}) to any other player j. The offer
reflects the outside options of the players other than the proposer. Due to the recursive
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nature of our mechanism, these options are given by their Shapley value in the game
without the proposer. Finally, notice that if the game is strictly zero-monotonic11 not only
is the equilibrium outcome unique, but the equilibrium strategies are unique as well. This
eliminates problems of coordination among the players.
As we pointed out in the informal description of the mechanism, Theorem 1 holds if
proposer α obtains a payment u(α) lower than v(α) in case her offer is rejected. This is a
more reasonable assumption in those circumstances in which the technology is not
replicable. In such a case v(S) represents the payoff to the partners in S only if they have
access to the technology. If u(i) < v(i) for every i in N, then the equilibrium strategies are
unique even if the game is zero-monotonic and not strictly zero-monotonic.
A further advantage of the mechanism is that it is finite in contrast to the infinite
horizon mechanisms that implement the Shapley value in stationary SPE. Moreover, at
the proposed equilibrium strategies, only the first stage of the game is played, with the
proposal made by the chosen proposer accepted by the other players.
We can modify our mechanism by replacing the bidding stage with a random
selection of the proposer. Once the proposer is determined, the game proceeds similarly
to our mechanism with the only difference being that in case of rejection the new
proposer is randomly selected from the remaining players. This modified mechanism
coincides with the Mas-Colell [18] and Hart and Mas-Colell [13] (with removal
probability equal to one) construction. In this mechanism, however,  the equilibrium
payoffs yield the Shapley value in expected terms only.
4.- Implementation of the weighted Shapley values
The weighted Shapley value emerges out of considering non-symmetric divisions of
the surplus. It is defined in Shapley [25] by stipulating an exogenously given system of
weights w∈Rn++. Each unanimity game is assigned a value by having agent i receive the
share ∑
∈Nj
ji ww /  of the unit. The w-weighted Shapley value of a game is defined as the
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linear extension of this operator to the game. We denote by φwi(N) the w-weighted
Shapley value of player i in the cooperative game (N, v).
A convenient way to express the weighted Shapley value is through the weighted
potential function Pw(N) defined in Hart and Mas-Colell [12].12 The w-weighted potential
Pw(N) is the unique function from the set of games into R that satisfies Pw(Φ) = 0 and
∑
∈
=
Ni
w
ii NvNPDw )()( , where DiPw(N) = Pw(N) − Pw(N\{i}). This function satisfies:
wiDiPw(N) = φwi(N). Furthermore,
.}){\()(1)( 
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
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Nj
w
j
Nj
jw jNPwNvwNP
The weighted Shapley value, as the Shapley value, can be calculated using a
recursive procedure. The role played by this formula in the proof of Theorem 2 is similar
to the role played by the recursive formula characterizing the Shapley value in the proof
of Theorem 1:
Lemma 1.- The weighted Shapley value of player i satisfies the equality:
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wi
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jwi jNwiNvNvwwN }){\(})){\()((
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Proof.- The weighted Shapley value of player i satisfies:
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We will now indicate how to modify our original bidding mechanism in order to
obtain as an equilibrium outcome any weighted Shapley value. The only difference is in
the construction of the weighted net bids Bwi. The determination of net bids incorporates
the vector of weights w∈Rn++ by having ∑∑
≠≠
−=
ij
j
i
j
ij
i
j
ii
w bwbwB . Other than that
change, the weighted bidding mechanism proceeds like the bidding mechanism.
Intuitively we weigh each bid differently, according to the exogenously given weight of
the person making the bid.
Theorem 2.- The weighted bidding mechanism implements the weighted Shapley value
of the zero-monotonic game (N, v) in SPE.
The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to the proof of Theorem 1.
Finally, note that we can implement the weighted Shapley value in expected terms
by using a simpler mechanism (similar to the Mas-Colell [18] and Hart and Mas-Colell
[13], construction for the Shapley value). Given a system of weights w∈Rn++, we replace
the bidding stage by a random choice of the proposer, where the probability of player i to
be chosen as the proposer equals ∑
∈Nj
ji ww / (rather than 1/n).
5.- General transferable utility games and the formation of coalitions
The only requirement we have imposed so far on the cooperative environment is that
of zero-monotonicity. Zero-monotonic environments might still violate super-additivity.
Therefore the (weighted) bidding mechanism implements the (weighted) Shapley value
even in some non super-additive settings. This result however is not entirely satisfactory
since the outcome while coinciding with the Shapley value might not be “really”
efficient. The sum of payments would indeed equal v(N), yet v(N) might not be the
maximal payoff the players could obtain. Note that in non super-additive environments it
19
might be possible for the players to obtain a sum of payments that exceeds v(N) by
splitting up into two or more coalitions.
One way to resolve this difficulty might be to consider the super-additive cover of
the environment. If we apply our mechanism to the super-additive cover of the
environment rather than to the original environment, the equilibria outcomes would
coincide with the Shapley value of the super-additive cover. A possible disadvantage of
this approach is that a player (the proposer) is able to collect rents from a coalition of
which she is not an active member. In other words, a player can act as a "principal" for a
coalition formed by other players.13
One way to avoid the use of “principals” is to modify our mechanism. The new
generalized bidding mechanism would generate a coalition structure in which proposers
would receive (when there is no rejection) just the value of the coalition to which they
belong. In this mechanism the players would not only share the surplus but would also
form coalitions in a sequential way. We show that at any SPE, the coalitions formed will
constitute an efficient coalition structure and the final payments of the players will
coincide with the Shapley value of the super-additive cover of the environment.
Before proceeding with the formal description of the generalized bidding mechanism
we introduce the following notation. The super-additive (SA) cover of a cooperative
game in characteristic form (N, v), is denoted by (N, V). The value V(S), for S⊆N, is
defined by: }.ofpartitionais)({Max)( SSvSV
S
pi
pi
pi ∑
∈
=
We denote the Shapley value of player i in the SA cover of (N, v) by Θi(N), and
similarly for the values Θi(S) of subsets S of N.
We know that: ( ) .}){\(1}){\()(1)( ∑
≠
Θ+−=Θ
ij
ii jN
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A partition pi such that ∑
∈
=
piS
SvNV )()( is called an efficient partition for N.
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The generalized bidding mechanism (GBM) is similar to the bidding mechanism.
The only difference is that in the GBM, the proposer, in addition to offering a vector of
payments to all the other players, also chooses a coalition she wants to form and be a
member of. Hence, an offer by the proposer consists of a payments vector and a coalition.
The offer is accepted if all the other players agree. In case of acceptance the coalition is
formed, the proposer collects the value of that coalition and the players outside the
coalition proceed to play the same game again among themselves. In the case of rejection
all the players other than the proposer play the same game again.
Formally, if there is only one player {i}, she obtains the value of the stand-alone
coalition. Given the rules of the game when played by at most n−1 players, the game for
N = {1,..., n} players proceeds as follows:
t = 1: Each player i∈N makes bids bij in R for every j ≠ i.
Player α is chosen as in the bidding mechanism. She pays bαi to every player i ≠ α.
t = 2: Player α chooses a coalition Sα with α∈Sα and makes an offer yαi in R to every
player i ≠ α.
t = 3: The players other than α, sequentially, either accept or reject the offer. If an
agent rejects it, then the offer is rejected. Otherwise, the offer is accepted.
If the offer is accepted, each player i ≠ α receives yαi and player α receives the value of
the coalition Sα minus the payments ∑
≠α
α
i
iy . After this, players in N\Sα proceed to play the
GBM again among themselves. (Therefore, final payment to a player i∈Sα\{α} is yαi +
bαi, player α receives ∑∑
≠≠
−−
α
α
α
α
α
i
i
i
i bySv )( , and the final payment for a player i∈N\Sα
will be the sum of the bid bαi, the offer yαi, and the outcome of the GBM where the
players are N\Sα.) On the other hand, if the offer is rejected, all players other than α
proceed to play the GBM where the set of players is N\{α} and player α receives the
value of her stand-alone coalition.
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Theorem 3.- The generalized bidding mechanism implements the Shapley value of the
SA cover of the game (N, v).
Proof: The arguments, in part, are very similar to those used in Theorem 1, thus we
emphasize just the new features of this proof and otherwise rely on the reasoning
employed in Theorem 1.
It is easy to see that the theorem holds for k = 1. We assume that it holds for k = n−1 and
then consider the following strategies:
At t = 1, each player i, i ∈ N, announces bij = Θj(N) − Θj(N\{i}), for every j ≠ i.
At t = 2, player i, i ∈ N, if she is the proposer, chooses a coalition Si such that Si ∈
ArgmaxS⊆N {v(S) + V(N\S)  i in S} and offers }){\( iNy jij Θ=  to every j ∈ Si\{i} and
)\(}){\( ijjij SNiNy Θ−Θ=  to every j ∉ Si.
At t = 3, player i, i ∈ N, if player j ≠ i is the proposer and i ∈ Sj, accepts any offer
greater than or equal to Θi(N\{j}) and rejects it otherwise. If player j ≠ i is the proposer
and i ∉ Sj, player i accepts any offer greater than or equal to Θi(N\{j}) − Θi(N\ Sj) and
rejects it otherwise.
Following these strategies, the proposer selects a coalition Sα that is part of an efficient
partition.14 Also, the induction argument ensures that, in the game that  follows among
the players in N\Sα, player i ∉ Sα will obtain Θi(N\ Sα). It is then easy to see that the
previous strategies yield Θi(N) to any player i.
To prove that the previous strategies constitute an SPE, note, first, that the strategy at t =
3 is a best response for any player different from the proposer by the same argument we
used in Theorem 1. At t = 2, given the rejection criteria used by the other players, if
player i is the proposer, she chooses a subset Si that maximizes:
 v(Si) − ∑
∈
Θ
}\{
}){\(  
iSj
j
i
iN  − [ ]∑
∉
Θ−Θ
iSj
ijj SNiN )\(}){\(  = v(Si) + V(N\Si) − V(N\{i}).
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Therefore, the proposed strategy is optimal. Finally, an argument similar to the one in the
proof of Theorem 1 demonstrates the optimality of the strategies at t = 1.
To show that any SPE yields the Shapley value, we proceed by a series of claims.
We state the claims without proof, since they are similar to those in Theorem 1. To
simplify notation, we denote the “effective offer” to player i ≠ α in stage 2, when player
α
 is the proposer by zαi, and define it as zαi = yαi if i ∈ Sα\{α} and zαi = yαi + Θi(N\Sα) if i
∉ Sα. By the induction argument, the effective offer is the total payment (without taking
into account the bid already received) that a player will receive (at equilibrium) if the
offer is accepted.
Claim (a). In any SPE, at t = 3, any player j ≠ α accepts the offer if  zαj is strictly
greater than Θi(N\{α}) for every player i ≠ α. Moreover, if zαi < Θi(N\{α}) for at
least some i ≠ α, then the offer is rejected.
Claim (b). If the coalition {α} is not part of any efficient partition, then in any SPE
of the game that starts at t = 2, α will choose a coalition Sα that is part of an
efficient partition. Furthermore, player α will announce offers such that zαi =
Θi(N\{α}) for any player i ≠ α . Finally, at t = 3, every player i ≠ α accepts any
offer such that zαi ≥ Θi(N\{α}).
If the coalition {α} is part of any efficient partition, there exist other equilibria in
addition to the previous ones. Any set of strategies where, at t = 2, the proposer
makes offers such that zαj ≤ Θj(N\{α}) to a particular player j ≠ α and, at t = 3, the
player j rejects any effective offer less than or equal to Θj(N\{α}), also constitute an
SPE.
In all the SPE of this subgame, the payoffs (taking into account the continuation of
the game after Sα has been formed) to players α and i ≠ α are V(N) − V(N\{α}) −
∑
≠α
α
j
jb  and Θi(N\{α}) + bαi , respectively.
(Notice that following both types of strategies an efficient partition is formed.)
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Claim (c). In any SPE, Bi = 0 for all i in N.
Claim (d). In any SPE, each player’s payoff is the same regardless of who is chosen
as the proposer.
Claim (e). In any SPE, the final payment received by each of the players coincides
with his Shapley value in the SA cover. Q. E. D.
Theorem 3 shows that when facing environments where forming the grand coalition
might not be efficient, it is possible to employ a generalized version of our original
bidding mechanism that allows both that an efficient partition can be formed and that the
surplus can be shared in a “reasonable” way. If the game is super-additive, the
generalized version yields the same outcome as the bidding mechanism. It is however
important to notice that, if the game is not super-additive but the grand coalition is
efficient, this coalition is formed under both mechanisms although the sharing of the
surplus will be different. The reason is that the Shapley value of the super-additive cover
usually does not coincide with the Shapley value of the game if the game is not super-
additive.
Our GBM provides support for the use of the Shapley value of the SA cover as the
generalization of the Shapley value for games in which it is efficient to form coalition
structures which are different from the grand coalition. The GBM implements the
Shapley value of the SA cover by simultaneously providing a bidding and coalition
formation game. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that supports this
solution concept. Aumann and Dréze [1] study games with a (given) coalition structure
and define a value that assigns to each player his Shapley value in the coalition he
belongs to. Under this concept, the payoff to any player does not depend upon his
contribution to coalitions other than his coalition. The Shapley value of the super-additive
cover takes into account not only the contribution of a player to the coalition he belongs
to in an efficient structure, but also his potential contribution to any other coalition.15
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6.- Conclusion
The object of this paper was to construct a simple non-cooperative mechanism to
realize a sharing of the surplus in a cooperative environment. The mechanism we use
basically consists of two distinct stages of play: a bidding stage, at the end of which a
winner is determined, followed by a proposal stage where the winner offers a sharing of
the surplus. In the case where the proposal is rejected, the same game is played again by
the players except for the proposer. We show that the payoff outcome of the subgame
perfect equilibria of this game always coincides with the Shapley value of the game.
Moreover, the strategies played by the players at equilibrium are simple and natural. We
also showed that a natural modification of the mechanism implements the weighted
Shapley value. Finally, we have introduced a simple generalization of the bidding
mechanism that handles situations where the grand coalition might not be efficient. By
playing the game, the players form, at equilibrium, an efficient coalition structure and
share the surplus according to the Shapley value of the super-additive cover of the
environment.
These mechanisms provide strong support for applying the Shapley value to
situations where cooperation is needed to obtain an efficient outcome. It might be also
used for a variety of cost allocation, revenue sharing, or partnership dissolution problems.
The general approach taken in this paper may yield ways to provide non-cooperative
foundations for other cooperative solution concepts for transferable utility games or for
cost-sharing methods. However, the extension of our approach to non-transferable utility
games is problematic. There exist several extensions of the Shapley value to non-
transferable utility games proposed by Harsanyi [9], Shapley [26], and Maschler and
Owen ([16],[17]). Dagan and Serrano [3] have shown that randomness is a necessary
component in a mechanism designed to implement any of these extensions. Since the
element of randomness in our mechanism (i. e., the tie-breaking rule) is inconsequential
to proving our results, it seems that the approach taken in this paper would fail to
implement the existing extensions of the Shapley value.
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1
 For a nice introduction to the Shapley value and, in particular, its applications, see, for example Roth [23].
2
 Crawford [2] also made use of a bidding stage in a procedure to generate Pareto-efficient egalitarian-
equivalent allocations. The discrete time non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game proposed by Evans
[6] to implement the core in subgame perfect equilibria also introduced simple bidding by the players for
the right to make an offer.
3
 The equilibrium strategies are unique if the game is strictly zero-monotonic. Otherwise, there might be
other equilibria in addition to this one, but they still yield the Shapley value.
4
 They also show that for NTU games, the limit of the SSPE (as the probability of removal becomes small)
is the consistent value, a solution concept that was introduced by Maschler and Owen ([16], [17]).
5
 Winter [28] also required either subgame consistency or strategic equilibria. Dasgupta and Chiu [4] also
developed an implementation for general games in characteristic form if there is an (external) planner who
is able to impose a system of transfers and taxes.
6
 Hart and Mas-Colell [12] also extended their results to weighted Shapley values.
7
 If the game is super-additive, the grand coalition is an efficient structure and the Shapley value of the
super-additive cover coincides with the Shapley value. Therefore, the final SPE outcome of the generalized
bidding mechanism is the same as the final SPE outcome of the bidding mechanism.
8
 We use φ(N) instead of φ(N, v) for notational simplicity.
9
 Note that the actual sequence of players is inconsequential. The fact that players respond in sequence
rather than simultaneously is crucial for ruling out “bad” equilibria.  In bad equilibria, there are several
players rejecting the proposal since whenever there is at least one rejection, a rejection by any other player
is optimal (the proposal will be rejected independently of his decision).
10
 Our results hold for any specification of the outside value for the proposer as long as she obtains a
payment less or equal to the value of her stand-alone coalition. See Section 7 in Hart and Mas-Colell [13]
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for an interpretation of a situation in which the proposer would obtain zero if the offer is rejected, and for
further discussion on this extension.
11
 We say that a game is strictly zero-monotonic if v(S) + v({i}) < v(S∪{i}) for any subsets S⊆N with i∉S
and S ≠ Φ.
12
 Again, we omit the constant v and write for short φwi(N) or Pw(N) instead of  φwi(N, v) or Pw(N, v).
13
 See Pérez-Castrillo [21] and Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [22] for the use of principals to realize
cooperative outcomes.
14
 It can be easily shown that V(N) = MaxS⊆N {v(S) + V(N\S)  α in S}, for any player α in N, hence when
the proposer chooses the best possible coalition to be a member of, she is choosing a coalition that forms
part of an efficient partition.
15
 Owen [20] and Hart and Kurz [10] also propose a coalition structure value to every game and every
coalition structure. However, in their approach, the coalition structure serves only as a bargaining tool to
increase the payoff of the members of the coalitions. At the end, all the players join the grand coalition.
